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Abstract 
Several countries and regions around the world, including Singapore, the United 
Kingdom, and the European Union are amending their restructuring framework to 
implement a pre-insolvency mechanism that includes most of the features existing in 
the US Chapter 11. However, unlike what happens in the United States, where 
unsuccessful reorganizations lead to Chapter 7 liquidations, companies using this ‘de 
facto Chapter 11’ (DFCH11) will be still allowed to use formal reorganization procedure. 
This paper argues that, while the rise of the DFCH11 is not necessarily undesirable 
provided that various protections are put in place, jurisdictions implementing this 
restructuring tool need to adapt their formal insolvency framework to this new era of 
‘pre-insolvency law’. Otherwise, some inefficiencies can be created from the lack of 
coordination between insolvency and pre-insolvency law, since non-viable firms as well 
as viable businesses managed by the wrong people can opportunistically delay the 
commencement of a liquidation procedure even when it is the most desirable outcome. 
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1. Introduction  
Many jurisdictions around the world are amending their restructuring framework to 
implement various types of pre-insolvency mechanisms, including what this article calls 
a ‘de facto Chapter 11’ (DFCH11).2 A DFCH11 is a restructuring tool that, even if it is 
designed as a pre-insolvency mechanism3 and exists along with formal reorganization 
procedures, provides debtors with most of the features existing in a US Chapter 11 
reorganization procedure, including a moratorium, cross-class cramdown, and the 
availability of debtor in possession (DIP) financing. Moreover, due to the pre-insolvency 
nature of this procedure, the managers are allowed to keep running the firm without the 
intervention of any supervisor or trustee, as it also happens in the US Chapter 11. 
Therefore, this pre-insolvency mechanism looks like a Chapter 11 reorganization 
procedure. It only differs in three primary aspects. First, while the DFCH11 seeks to 
help debtors when they are not insolvent yet, a Chapter 11 reorganization procedure 
may serve as both a pre-insolvency procedure and a formal insolvency proceeding 
seeking to assist viable companies unable to pay debts. 4 Second, unlike what happens 
in the United States where a failure to reach a reorganization agreement under a 
Chapter 11 procedure leads to a Chapter 7 liquidation, companies in jurisdictions with a 
 
2 These jurisdictions include Singapore, the United Kingdom and the European Union. For an 
analysis of the insolvency reforms in Singapore, see Gerard McCormack and Wai Yee Wan, 
Transplanting Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code into Singapore’s restructuring and 
insolvency laws: opportunities and challenges, JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW STUDIES (2018); 
Meng Seng Wee, Whither the Scheme of Arrangement in Singapore: More Chapter 11, Less 
Scheme? Working Paper (2017) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2922956). For the European Union, see 
Rolef de Weijs, Harmonization of European Insolvency Law: Preventing Insolvency Law from 
Turning against Creditors by Upholding the Debt–Equity Divide, 15 (2) EUROPEAN COMPANY AND 
FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW 403 (2018); Horst Eidenmüller, Contracting for a European Insolvency 
Regime, 18 EUROPEAN BUSINESS AND ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 273 (2017). For a general 
overview of the insolvency reforms planned in the United Kingdom, see Jennifer Payne, The 
Government announces radical changes to the UK debt restructuring regime, OXFORD BUSINESS 
LAW BLOG, 11 September 2018 (available at https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-
blog/blog/2018/09/government-announces-radical-changes-uk-debt-restructuring-regime). 
3 This article will use the term ‘pre-insolvency proceeding’ to refer to procedures usually 
characterized by two aspects. First, debtors are not formally insolvent yet. Second, debtors 
cannot enjoy certain tools available in insolvency proceedings. Therefore, the concept can 
capture both: (i) procedures that are not formally considered insolvency proceedings and just 
provide debtors with one or a few ‘insolvency tools’, such as the availability to impose a plan on 
some dissenting creditors within a class as it allows the UK Scheme of Arrangement; and (ii) 
procedures that, as it happens with the Singapore Scheme of Arrangement, are formally 
considered insolvency proceeding, provide various tools traditionally existing in formal 
reorganization procedures but do not usually require a situation of insolvency as a financial 
requirement to have access to the procedure. For an analysis of the definition, goals and 
features of pre-insolvency proceedings, see Nicolaes Tollenaar, PRE-INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: 
A NORMATIVE FOUNDATION AND FRAMEWORK (Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 38-98, 188-250. 
See also José María Garrido, OUT-OF-COURT DEBT RESTRUCTURING (World Bank Studies 2012), 
pp. 2-6; Horst Eidenmüller, What is an insolvency proceeding? ECGI LAW WORKING PAPER No 
335/2016 (https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/SSRN-
id2712628.pdf); Bob Wessels and Stephan Madaus, Instrument of the European Law Institute: 
Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law (2017), 
(https://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/Publications/Instrument_INSO
LVENCY.pdf), pp. 183-190. 
4 For the purpose of this article, ‘insolvency proceedings’ and ‘bankruptcy procedures’ will be 
used as synonyms.  
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DFCH11 are still allowed to use formal reorganization procedures. Third, despite the 
similarities between the US Chapter 11 and the pre-insolvency proceedings 
implemented in many jurisdictions, there are still some tools exclusively available in 
formal reorganization procedures (e.g., avoidance actions).  
This paper argues that, while the rise of this DFCH11 is not necessarily undesirable 
provided that some protections are put in place, jurisdictions implementing this new 
restructuring tool need to adapt their formal insolvency framework to this new era of 
‘pre-insolvency law’. Otherwise, some inefficiencies might be created from the lack of 
coordination between insolvency and pre-insolvency law. Namely, it will be argued that 
the rise of the DFCH11 proposed or adopted in several jurisdictions around the world, 
including Singapore, the United Kingdom and the European Union, should lead to 
restricting the use of formal reorganization proceedings. After all, if companies do not 
use a pre-insolvency mechanism that may facilitate, at a lower cost, a financial 
restructuring by providing some tools traditionally existing in a Chapter 11 
reorganization, or these pre-insolvency agreements fail, there will be reasons to believe 
that either the company is not viable or the creditors do not trust the managers. In 
either case, the company will not deserve to be reorganized. Therefore, unless some 
enhanced controls are put in place to prevent these companies from using formal 
reorganization procedures, there will be an increase in the number of debtors 
opportunistically filing for reorganization. And if so, creditors can respond with an 
increase in the cost of debt and value can be lost –at the expense the company, the 
employees, and the creditors as a whole– if non-viable firms are not quickly liquidated 
piecemeal and viable businesses are not sold as a going concern to a third party.  
This article is divided as follows. Section 2 discusses how countries and regions 
around the world are implementing a DFCH11. It also analyses the features and 
desirability of the primary features of the DFCH11, and why countries may have 
decided to implement a DFCH11 rather than a formal Chapter 11 reorganization 
procedure. Section 3 explains how and why countries implementing a DFCH11 should 
adapt their insolvency regimes to this new era of pre-insolvency law. Section 4 
concludes.  
2. The rise of pre-insolvency law  
2.1. Introduction 
There are several ways to sort out a debtor´s financial trouble. Perhaps, a simple way 
to classify debt restructuring tools can be drawn from the distinction between ‘formal’ 
and ‘non-formal’ insolvency proceedings. By formal insolvency proceedings, this paper 
will refer to those procedures provided by the legislator characterized by (i) the 
existence of a situation of insolvency5 or, at least, a collective action problem,6 (ii) a 
 
5 The concept of insolvency differs across jurisdictions. In general, there are two general 
concepts of insolvency: (i) balance-sheet insolvency, whenever a debtor´s liabilities exceed the 
value of the company´s assets; and (ii) cash-flow insolvency, whenever a debtor is unable to 
pay its debts as they fall due. For a detailed analysis of these concepts, see Roy Goode, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th Edition, 2011), pp. 109-147. 
Likewise, some jurisdictions, such as Germany and Spain, have also introduced the concept of 
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court in charge of overseeing the insolvency proceeding,7 (iii) special provisions to 
modify debt contracts without requiring the unanimity rule existing outside of 
bankruptcy,8 (iv) the protection of a moratorium,9 (v) special rules for the treatment of 
contracts and new financing, and (vi) the imposition of, or at least the ability to appoint 
under some circumstances, a trustee to manage or supervise the insolvency 
proceeding.10  
In contrast, the concept of ‘non-formal insolvency procedures’ used in this paper will 
include those debt restructuring tools that generally lack some of these features. 
Therefore, it will include, among others, the following mechanisms: (i) workouts or 
totally out-of-court debt restructuring agreements between debtors and creditors; (ii) 
mediation and conciliation proceedings, in which third parties are appointed to facilitate 
or propose a solution, respectively; (iii) scheme of arrangements, in which some 
special rules regarding voting, creditor classification and approval will apply; and (iv) a 
 
‘imminent insolvency’ to refer to those situations in which, even though a debtor is still able to 
pay its debts, it will unlikely be able to do so at some point in the near future (see, for example, 
article 2.3 of the Spanish Act and article 18 of the German Insolvency Act). For the purpose of 
this article, insolvency will be generally understood as inability to pay debts. Therefore, we will 
follow a cash-flow test, even though, in well-functioning markets, companies should become 
cash-flow insolvent once they are already balance-sheet insolvent. Otherwise, they should be 
able to borrow money. As a result, by ‘insolvent company’, this article will usually refer to 
companies that face a situation of both cash-flow insolvency and balance-sheet insolvency, 
even if, of course, balance-sheet insolvent firms can be in a situation of cash-flow solvency (as 
it may happen with many start-ups and companies reporting accounting losses but still with 
enough cash-flows to meet their payment obligations) and the other way around, that is, a cash-
flow insolvent firm can be balance-sheet solvent – as it may happen in situation in which, due to 
a credit freeze, companies are unable to borrow money, even if they have enough 
unencumbered assets to offer to their lenders.  
6 In some jurisdictions, such as the United States, companies are not required to prove a 
situation of ‘insolvency’. However, in the absence of a collective action problem and other 
similar ‘bankruptcy problems’, the court may dismiss the case. A situation of insolvency (or even 
imminent insolvency) usually involves collective action problems. Therefore, there is a potential 
role of bankruptcy law in these situations. For some authors, solving the collective action 
problems generated in a situation is one of the primary roles of insolvency law. See Thomas H. 
Jackson, Thomas H. Jackson, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (Harvard University 
Press, 1986), pp. 1-19.  
7 In some countries, the role of bankruptcy court can be played by some administrative bodies 
with judicial powers. For the purpose of this article, these administrative bodies in charge of 
overseeing insolvency proceedings are also included in the concept of ‘bankruptcy courts’.  
8 Outside of bankruptcy, debt contracts can only be modified by all creditors. In a formal 
insolvency proceeding, however, this unanimity rule is no longer required.   
9 This moratorium, as it is called in the United Kingdom and Singapore, or ‘automatic stay’, as it 
is referred to in the United States, has been classified as the primary features of insolvency 
proceedings, since it protects the debtor´s assets against the enforcement actions potentially 
initiated by the creditors. See Richard Squire, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY AND FINANCIAL 
REORGANIZATION (Wolters Kluwer, 2016), p. 13. 
10 For a deeper analysis of the concept and features of insolvency proceedings, see Horst 
Eidenmüller, What is an insolvency proceeding? ECGI LAW WORKING PAPER No 335/2016. For 
an analysis of the differences between ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ insolvency mechanisms, see José 
María Garrido, OUT-OF-COURT DEBT RESTRUCTURING (World Bank Studies 2012), pp. 2-6. It 
should be noted that the appointment of the trustee is not required in some insolvency 
jurisdictions adopting a debtor in possession, as it is the case of the United States. Under the 
US Bankruptcy Code, the debtor remains in possession during a Chapter 11 reorganization. 
Only in Chapter 7 liquidations, as well as exceptional cases in Chapter 11, a trustee is 
appointed to manage the procedure.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3290366 
7 
 
DFCH11, sometimes designed as a type of ‘enhanced scheme of arrangement’,11 
which is a more complex restructuring procedure that includes various features of 
insolvency proceedings, particularly from the US Chapter 11. All of these ‘non-formal 
insolvency proceedings’, and especially those requiring some type of regulation, will be 
included under the concept of ‘pre-insolvency law’ used in this paper.12  
2.2. The rise of the DFCH11 around the world  
 
2.2.1. Overview  
The US Chapter 11 differs from other reorganization procedures around the world on 
two primary aspects: (i) the governance of the insolvency proceeding; (ii) and the 
insolvency tools available to facilitate the reorganization of the company. In terms of 
 
11 This type of ‘enhanced scheme of arrangement’ can be found in Singapore, where the debtor 
enjoys most of the benefits existing in a Chapter 11 reorganization (e.g., moratorium, cross-
class cramdown –different from the one existing in the US Chapter 11 though, since it requires 
enhanced majorities–,DIP financing, no appointment of supervisors/trustees), but the procedure 
is conducted through a Scheme of Arrangement rather than a formal reorganization proceeding. 
Therefore, while debtors in the United States seeking to reorganize their capital structure 
through a formal reorganization procedure can only file for Chapter 11, companies in Singapore 
can use both the Scheme of Arrangement and the judicial management. In Spain, a similar 
restructuring tool applies. However, the procedure is not formally structured as a Scheme of 
Arrangement, and the debtor does not enjoy some of the ‘insolvency tools’ available under the 
‘enhanced scheme of arrangement’ existing in Singapore such as the cross-class cramdown 
and the special regime of rescue financing. Therefore, while both procedures could be classified 
under the broad concept of DFCH11 used in this paper, there will be different levels of intensity 
of DFCH11, depending on the number of insolvency tools existing in these restructuring 
procedures. For this purpose, the Singapore Scheme of Arrangement would be a strong-form of 
DFCH11 while the Spanish pre-insolvency mechanism a low-medium form of DFCH11. For an 
analysis of the Singapore enhanced scheme, see Gerard McCormack and Wai Yee Wan, 
Transplanting Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code into Singapore’s restructuring and 
insolvency laws: opportunities and challenges, JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW STUDIES (2018); 
Meng Seng Wee, Whither the Scheme of Arrangement in Singapore: More Chapter 11, Less 
Scheme? Working Paper (2017) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2922956). For an analysis of the pre-
insolvency framework in Spain, see Ignacio Tirado, Out of Court Debt Restructuring in Spain: A 
Modernised Framework (2018) (available at 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/tirado_modernised_framework.pdf); Aurelio Gurrea 
Martínez, The low usage of bankruptcy procedures: A cultural problem? Lessons from Spain, 
IBERO-AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND FINANCE, WORKING PAPER SERIES, Núm. 1, 2016 
(available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2783666). For a more 
detailed analysis of the Spanish restructuring framework, and how it differs from other pre-
insolvency proceedings existing in other jurisdictions, see Juana Pulgar Ezquerra, 
PRECONCURSALIDAD Y REESTRUCTURACIÓN EMPRESARIAL (Wolters Kluwer, 2n Edition, 2016). 
12 Some authors distinguish five types of insolvency proceedings depending on both the level of 
regulatory intervention and the severity of the debtor´s financial trouble. These procedures 
include: (i) informal or out of-court proceedings (workouts); (ii) enhanced restructuring; (iii) 
hybrid procedure; (iv) formal reorganizations; and (v) formal insolvency. See José María 
Garrido, OUT-OF-COURT DEBT RESTRUCTURING (World Bank Studies 2012), pp. 2-6. For the 
distinction between ‘insolvency law’ and ‘pre-insolvency law’, as well as ‘insolvency law’ and 
‘restructuring law’, see Sarah Paterson, Rethinking the Role of the Law of Corporate Distress in 
the Twenty-First Century, 35 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 1 (2015); Stephan Madaus, 
Leaving the Shadows of US Bankruptcy Law: A Proposal to Divide the Realms of Insolvency 
and Restructuring Law, 19(3) EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 615 (2018); 
Nicolaes Tollenaar, PRE-INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: A NORMATIVE FOUNDATION AND FRAMEWORK 
(Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 8-80, 188-250. 
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governance, the US Chapter 11 allows incumbent managers to keep running the 
insolvent firm without the appointment of a supervisor or trustee to oversee the 
procedure.13 This is something relatively unique of the US Chapter 11. In general, most 
countries around the world impose the appointment of an insolvency practitioner to 
either replace the managers or, if they are allowed to preserve their positions, monitor 
the management team. Therefore, a DIP can only be seen outside the US in some 
types of non-insolvency proceedings such as a scheme of arrangement, in which the 
nature and scope of these tools might not recommend the mandatory appointment of a 
third party to oversee the procedure.  
As for the insolvency tools available in a Chapter 11 reorganization, the US Bankruptcy 
Code provides most of the provisions existing in any formal insolvency regime, such as 
avoidance actions, special treatment of executory contracts, and the automatic stay. 
Furthermore, and perhaps more interestingly, it also establishes some additional tools 
to facilitate a corporate restructuring that are not often found elsewhere. These tools 
include the super-priority status given to certain post-petition financing (‘DIP financing’), 
as well as the ability to impose a plan on some dissenting classes of creditors (‘cross-
class cramdown’).14 
In recent years, many countries around the world, including Singapore, the United 
Kingdom, and the European Union, are amending their pre-insolvency framework to 
implement some of these features existing in the US Chapter 11.15 Namely, these new 
 
13 For a general overview about different models of ‘insolvency governance’, see Horst 
Eidenmüller, Comparative corporate insolvency law, ECGI LAW WORKING PAPER NO 319/2016 
(available at https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/SSRN-
id2799863.pdf), pp. 14-16. 
14 Most jurisdictions around the world provide a moratorium, special rules to approve a plan 
without the consent of all the creditors, and new rules for executory contracts and post-petition 
financing. Nevertheless, the US Chapter 11 differs significantly from other reorganization 
regimes in at least three aspects. First, unless most jurisdictions around the world, which only 
provides an intra-class cramdown (that is, the possibility of imposing the plan on dissenting 
creditors within the same class), the US Chapter 11 provides a powerful cross-class cramdown 
that only requires the approval of a single class of creditors to impose the class on other 
classes, provided that other conditions are met (mainly respect of the absolute priority rule and 
no discrimination unfairly). Second, while many jurisdictions around the world only gives 
preferential treatment to post-petition lenders, the US Chapter 11 provides a system that, under 
some circumstances, may give this preferential treatment altering pre-existing creditors’ rights. 
Finally, unlike most formal reorganization procedures around the world, the US Chapter 11 does 
not impose the appointment of a supervisor or trustee to oversee the insolvency proceeding.  
15 For an analysis of the insolvency reforms in Singapore, see Gerard McCormack and Wai Yee 
Wan, Transplanting Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code into Singapore’s restructuring and 
insolvency laws: opportunities and challenges, JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW STUDIES (2018); 
Meng Seng Wee, Whither the Scheme of Arrangement in Singapore: More Chapter 11, Less 
Scheme? Working Paper (2017) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2922956). For a study of pre-insolvency 
proceedings in Europe, see Lorenzo Stanghellini, Rizwaan J. Mokal, Christoph G. Paulus, and 
Ignacio Tirado (eds.), BEST PRACTICES IN EUROPEAN RESTRUCTURING: CONTRACTUALISED DISTRESS 
RESOLUTION IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW (Wolters Kluwer, 2018). Analysing the European 
Directive on Preventive Frameworks and Second Chance, see Gerard McCormack, Corporate 
Restructuring Law – A second chance for Europe? 42 EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW 532 (2017); Horst 
Eidenmüller, Contracting for a European Insolvency Regime, 18 EUROPEAN BUSINESS AND 
ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 273, 289-291, 298-303 (2017). For a general overview about the 
insolvency reforms taking place in the United Kingdom, see Jennifer Payne, The Government 
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pre-insolvency proceedings seek to provide debtors with a moratorium and restriction 
of ipso facto clauses, which are tools that typically exist in formal reorganization 
proceedings,16 as well as some provisions specifically provided in the US Chapter 11 
(e.g., cross-class cramdown and the super-priority given to certain post-petition 
financing). Moreover, due to the ‘pre-insolvency nature’ of these procedures, the debtor 
will usually remain in possession without the supervision of an insolvency practitioner,17 
which is something new for many restructuring procedures around the world usually 
characterized by the appointment of a supervisor or trustee.18   
While the new restructuring framework implemented in many jurisdictions around the 
world looks like a Chapter 11 reorganization, it differs from the US reorganization 
procedure on two primary aspects. First, unlike the US Chapter 11, this new 
restructuring tool is being implemented as a pre-insolvency proceeding.19 Therefore, 
unless countries implementing the DFCH11 decide to abolish their formal 
reorganization procedures, debtors coming from a failed DFCH11 can still file for 
reorganization, which is something that it is not possible in the United States – where 
failed Chapter 11 reorganizations lead to Chapter 7 liquidations. Second, even though 
a DFCH11 may enjoy many tools existing in the US Bankruptcy Code, other insolvency 
provisions traditionally existing in a formal Chapter 11 (e.g., avoidance actions, special 
ranking of claims, executory contracts) will remain exclusively available for formal 
reorganization procedures. For this reason, this new restructuring tool is best 
understood as a ‘de facto’, rather than an actual, Chapter 11 reorganization. 
2.2.2. The DIP as a governance system for insolvency proceedings  
 
announces radical changes to the UK debt restructuring regime, OXFORD BUSINESS LAW BLOG, 
11 September 2018 (available at https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-
blog/blog/2018/09/government-announces-radical-changes-uk-debt-restructuring-regime).  
16 The use of a moratorium is provided in most (if not all) insolvency jurisdictions around the 
world, since it is probably the most important insolvency tool to preserve value. In the absence 
of the automatic stay, creditors would be incentivized to start a ‘race to collect’ that may end up 
destroying the going concern value potentially existing in the insolvent firm, in addition to 
increasing collection costs for the creditors. See Thomas H. Jackson, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW (Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 16-17. The prohibition to enforce ipso 
facto clauses after the commencement of a restructuring/insolvency proceeding is a more 
controversial issue. For this reason, the enforceability or not of these clauses significantly differ 
across jurisdictions, usually depending on how debtor-friendly or creditor-friendly a jurisdiction 
might be. In debtor-friendly jurisdictions (e.g., USA), these clauses will unlikely be enforced. In 
creditor-friendly jurisdictions (e.g., Singapore before the 2018 Insolvency Bill), these clauses 
can be enforced and therefore the debtor´s counterparty can terminate the contract.  
17 In the United Kingdom, however, the new restructuring tool will likely require the appointment 
of an insolvency practitioner to oversee the reorganization process.  
18 The appointment of a supervisor or trustee has been something common in most 
reorganization procedures around the world, including those existing in the United Kingdom, 
Singapore, and most countries in Continental Europe. 
19 The distinction between ‘insolvency’ and ‘pre-insolvency’ law is becoming even more unclear 
in this new era of ‘pre-insolvency law’. As Eidenmüller mentions, if any US fellow looks at the 
features of the ‘enhanced Scheme of Arrangement’ existing in Singapore or the new 
restructuring tool implemented in Europe, they would probably think that it is a formal 
reorganization procedure, despite the fact that the procedure does not provide some ‘insolvency 
tools’ traditionally existing in bankruptcy (e.g., avoidance actions). See Horst Eidenmüller, 
Contracting for a European Insolvency Regime, 18 EUROPEAN BUSINESS AND ORGANIZATION LAW 
REVIEW 273, 290.  
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2.2.2.1. The costs and benefits of a DIP regime  
The implementation of a DIP as a system of governance for insolvency proceedings 
may have several advantages. First, it can save the costs associated with the 
remuneration of a supervisor or trustee. Therefore, it can increase the pie available for 
distribution, what it will lead to lower recoveries for the creditors, and therefore, from an 
ex ante perspective, a higher cost of debt. Second, the implementation of this model 
may also reduce the costs associated with disrupting the company´s business 
relationships with suppliers, consumers, and other stakeholders, in addition to taking 
advantage of the managers´ existing connections.20 Third, even though a trustee may 
be an expert in corporate reorganizations, it might lack the expertise of a particular 
business or economic sector. Therefore, it might not make the most value-maximizing 
decisions for a particular business. Fourth, under a DIP, the managers keep their jobs 
after the commencement of the insolvency proceeding. Thus, they will have more 
incentives to file for bankruptcy at a timely manner. Fifth, the system of appointment of 
trustees is far from perfect. In countries where the debtor can appoint the administrator, 
as it may happen in the UK, the trustee may have perverse incentives to favor the 
debtor over the creditors. In countries where the creditors play a major role in the 
appointment of the trustee, as it happens in Germany and Singapore, some 
asymmetries of information, collective action problems, and conflicts of interests may 
undermine the quality of the decision. Finally, in countries like Spain and Colombia, 
where the trustee has been traditionally appointed at the discretion of the court among 
a list of experts, some cases of corruption and conflicts of interests between judges 
and trustees have been detected, especially in large bankruptcy cases in which the 
remuneration of the trustee can be very high.21 Therefore, even though some 
regulatory tools can be implemented to minimize the costs associated with these 
existing models,22 the DIP seems to avoid this problem.  
As a result of all of its benefits, insolvency jurisdictions should have strong incentives to 
implement a debtor in possession. However, while the idea of implementing a DIP may 
sound very appealing, it can also create some problems. On the one hand, it may allow 
inefficient (even dishonest) managers to keep running the firm. On the other hand, it 
may exacerbate the misalignment of incentives between debtors/managers and 
 
20 Oliver Williamson, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL 
ORGANIZATION (The Free Press, 1975) 
21 These practices have led the legislator in both jurisdictions to change the system of 
appointment of trustees. In Colombia, a system of automatized appointment based on an 
algorithm has been put in place. In Spain, the legislator has decided to implement a system 
randomly assigned trustees among those included in a list of people meeting certain 
requirements. However, both jurisdictions still allow, in some exceptional cases, the 
appointment of the trustee at the discretion of the court. These exceptional appointments 
usually take place in complex bankruptcy cases. Therefore, the conflict of interests that the 
legislator sought to solve might not really disappear, since the bankruptcy court will still have the 
ability to choose the trustee in complex and large bankruptcy cases, which are usually those 
with higher fees.   
22 The advantages and disadvantages of the debtor in possession, as well as some regulatory 
proposals to improve the transparency, effectiveness and efficiency of the existing models of 
appointment of trustees can be found in Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, EL DERECHO CONCURSAL EN 
ESPAÑA: PROBLEMAS ESTRUCTURALES Y PROPUESTA DE REFORMA (Reus, 2018), pp. 135-145.  
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creditors potentially existing in the zone of insolvency.23 Therefore it may increase the 
risk that the debtor engages in several forms of opportunistic behaviors (e.g., asset 
substitution, asset dilution, etc.)24 even after the commencement of the insolvency 
proceeding. Moreover, this risk of opportunism becomes even higher in countries with 
controlling shareholders and small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), since the 
managers are either the shareholders themselves or closely monitored by the 
shareholders.25 Thus, there will be a higher dependency or even identity between 
shareholders and managers. Therefore, in this type of companies, managers will have 
more incentives to maximize the interests of the shareholders or, at least, the interests 
of the controlling shareholders. Even though this situation may be desirable in solvent 
companies, in the context of financially distressed firms, it may exacerbate the conflicts 
between shareholders and creditors.  
Therefore, the risk of expropriation of shareholders/managers vis-à-vis creditors will be 
higher in the context of SMEs and large companies with controlling shareholders facing 
financial trouble. As a result, the implementation of a DIP in countries with this type of 
companies – which are most countries around the world26 – not only may create an 
undesirable transfer of wealth ex post, but it could also lead to an ex ante increase in 
the cost of debt or more strict covenants that may ultimately harm the levels of 
entrepreneurship, innovation, and access to finance in the country. Therefore, even 
though the DIP may create several benefits, jurisdictions seeking to implement this 
model should carefully analyze and, if so, minimize these problems.27  
 
23 Michael C. Jensen y William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 305, 333-343 (1976). 
24 John Armour, Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda, Transactions with Creditors, in John Armour, 
Luca Enriques et al, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp.109-114. 
25  Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, The low usage of bankruptcy procedures: A cultural problem? 
Lessons from Spain, IBERO-AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND FINANCE, WORKING PAPER SERIES, 
Núm. 1, 2016 (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2783666); 
Gerard McCormack and Wai Yee Wan, Transplanting Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code 
into Singapore’s restructuring and insolvency laws: opportunities and challenges, JOURNAL OF 
CORPORATE LAW STUDIES (2018). 
26 Rafael La Porta, Florencio López de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, Law and 
Finance, 106 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta, Florencio López de 
Silanes and Robert Vishny, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 
471 (1999); Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov and Larry Lang, 2000, The Separation of 
Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 81 
(1999); Fabrizio Barca and Marco Becht (eds.), THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE (Oxford 
University Press, 2002); Luca Enriques and Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in 
Continental Europe, 21 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 117 (2007); Andy J.Y. Yeh, 
Steven Lim and Ed Vos, Path Dependence or Convergence? The Evolution of Corporate 
Ownership Around the World, REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 517 (2007); Julian R. Franks and 
Colin Mayer, Evolution of Ownership and Control Around the World: The Changing Face of 
Capitalism, EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE (ECGI) - FINANCE WORKING PAPER 
NO. 503/2017; Ronald W. Masulis, Peter K. Pham and Jason Zein, Family Business Groups 
Around the World: Financing Advantages, Control Motivations, and Organizational Choices, 24 
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 3556 (2011). 
27 For example, as a way to solve the first problem associated with a DIP regime (that is, 
keeping in office inefficient or dishonest managers), the legislator could facilitate the removal of 
the managers by the creditors. For the second problem, associated with the higher risk of 
opportunism of shareholders/managers vis-à-vis creditors, the legislator could implement 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3290366 
12 
 
2.2.2.2. A DIP in pre-insolvency proceedings  
The implementation of a DIP may increase the risk of opportunistic behavior existing in 
the context of distressed firms, which may in return lead to various costs ex ante (e.g., 
increase in the cost of debt) and ex post (e.g., transfer of wealth from the company´s 
creditors to the shareholders/managers). However, if a company is just facing financial 
trouble but it is still solvent and therefore the shareholders are in the money, the risk of 
opportunistic behavior of shareholders vis-à-vis creditors will be significantly reduced. 
In these circumstances, the shareholders (or the managers on their behalf) will unlikely 
bet the firm as it may happen in insolvency.28 Instead, the managers will have 
incentives to pursue those projects with the highest net present value. Therefore, in 
solvent firms, or even firms approaching insolvency, the interests of the creditors will be 
more aligned with the interest of the shareholders. For this reason, a DIP in pre-
insolvency procedures may make more sense than a DIP in formal insolvency 
proceedings, since the shareholders can still be in the money. Thus, as the risk of 
engaging in opportunistic behavior will be lower in the context of solvent firms just 
facing or foreseeing financial trouble, the appointment of a trustee might not be 
necessary as a way to protect creditors. And in companies with dispersed ownership 
structures –as it is the case of large listed companies in the United Kingdom and the 
United States29– the justification for a trustee will be even weaker since the directors 
will be more independent from the shareholders. As a result, the risks of favoring the 
shareholders at the expense of the creditors will be lower in these countries.  
 
several measures, including new fiduciary duties toward the creditors, a harsher liability regime 
for breach of fiduciary duties, more power and information given to creditors in bankruptcy, or 
the creation of a governmental agency to supervise DIPs as it happens in the United States. 
28 This problem, generally known as ‘asset substitution’, relies on the intuition that the 
shareholders, once they have lost everything, may have incentives to pursue very risky 
investments (or ask the managers to do so) even if these projects have a negative net present 
value but in case of success yield very high returns. Thus, if the project succeeds, the 
shareholders can still recover part of their investments. Nevertheless, if the project fails (as it is 
likely the case in this type of projects with negative net present value), the shareholders will lose 
nothing since they will be protected through the limited liability. Therefore, all the losses will be 
borne by the creditors. See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL 
ECONOMICS 305, 333-343 (1976); Paul Davies, 7 Directors' Creditor-Regarding Duties in 
Respect of Trading Decisions Taken in the Vicinity of Insolvency, EUROPEAN BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 301, 306-307 (2006); John Armour, Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda, 
Transactions with Creditors, in John Armour, Luca Enriques et al, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 111-112; 
Assaf Eisdorfer, Empirical Evidence of Risk Shifting in Financially Distressed Firms, 63 JOURNAL 
OF FINANCE 609 (2008). Showing that this asset substitution (or ‘risk shifting’) problem might 
really happen, however, see Erik Gilje, Do Firms Engage in Risk-Shifting? Empirical Evidence, 
29 REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 2925 (2016); Pablo Hernández, Paul Povel, and Giogo 
Sertsios, Does Risk Shifting Really Happen? Results from an Experiment, Working Paper 
(2014); B. Espen Eckbo and Karin S. Thorburn, Control Benefits and CEO Discipline in 
Automatic Bankruptcy Auctions, 69 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 227 (2003). 
29 Rafael La Porta, Florencio López de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, Law and 
Finance, 106 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta, Florencio López de 
Silanes and Robert Vishny, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 
471 (1999). However, see Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United 
States, 44 THE REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 1377 (2009). 
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Therefore, it seems reasonable the solution adopted in Singapore and the European 
Union, where the appointment of an insolvency practitioner is not formally required in 
pre-insolvency proceeding,30 even if scheme managers are often appointed in 
Singapore and a similar patter may occur in Europe. By contrast, the mandatory 
appointment of insolvency practitioners proposed in the United Kingdom for the new 
restructuring tool does not seem very convincing.31 In my opinion, the imposition of an 
insolvency practitioner to oversee the restructuring process will unnecessarily increase 
the costs associated with these procedures. Moreover, even though the appointment of 
an insolvency practitioner may create several gains mainly associated with the 
credibility and expertise of these professionals (especially in countries with a qualified 
body of insolvency practitioners as it happens in the United Kingdom), these gains 
might not exceed their costs. Otherwise, if the benefits associated with appointing an 
insolvency practitioner really outweighed its costs, the debtor –sometimes encouraged 
by its creditors– would have incentives to voluntary hire an insolvency practitioner to 
oversee the restructuring process as it actually happens in many cases nowadays. 
Therefore, it would not be necessary to provide for the mandatory appointment of a 
supervisor, especially in a country with dispersed ownership structures such as the 
United Kingdom. It seems interesting that, while jurisdictions with companies with 
concentrated ownership structure as it happens in Singapore and the European Union 
are not imposing the mandatory appointment of a trustee even when there are more 
reasons to do so (due to the higher risk of opportunism of shareholder/managers vis-à-
vis creditors), countries with larger companies with dispersed ownership structures 
such as the United Kingdom has advocated for this approach. Perhaps, a more 
convincing argument to understand this reform can be found in the more powerful, 
organized lobby of insolvency practitioners existing in the United Kingdom.32  
2.2.3. (Cross-class) Cramdown  
Companies facing financial trouble should have incentives to reach an out-of-court 
restructuring or ‘workouts’. Through these non-bankruptcy devices, debtors may enjoy 
a higher degree of flexibility and, more importantly, they can save significant costs 
 
30 In insolvency proceedings, however, the appointment of an insolvency practitioner would 
make more sense in these countries, due to the higher alignment of incentives between 
managers and shareholders, and therefore the higher risk of opportunism of 
shareholders/managers vis-à-vis creditors.   
31 For a summary of the proposed reform in the United Kingdom, see 
https://www.r3.org.uk/index.cfm?page=1949&element=32517&refpage=1865  
32 Lobbies have often influenced the design of business laws. For instance, in the context of 
takeovers, it has been argued that the powerful lobby of managers in the US and the power of 
institutional investors in the UK made the regulatory framework of takeovers very director-
friendly and shareholder-friendly, respectively, in the US and the UK. See John Armour and 
David A. Skeel Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar 
Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation, 95 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 1727 (2007). 
Similarly, arguing that the families controlling most European corporations may have influenced 
the design of takeover law in Europe, see Marco Ventoruzzo, Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in 
Sheep's Clothing: Taking UK Rules to Continental Europe, 11 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW 135 (2008). Therefore, since the associations of insolvency 
practitioners are larger and more established in the United Kingdom, this lobby is probably more 
powerful than in Singapore or many European countries. 
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associated with filing for bankruptcy.33 However, this agreement is not always possible. 
In the absence of bankruptcy, an adjustment of debts requires the consent of all the 
creditors. Therefore, not only it is very costly, but it can also lead to various forms of 
holdout problems. As a way to solve these problems, insolvency legislators provide 
debtors with various legal devices, including the automatic stay and the possibility of 
imposing a plan on dissenting creditors.  
The ability to impose a plan on dissenting creditors is often called ‘cramdown’. There 
are two types of cramdown though: inter-class or cross-class cramdown, and intra-
class cramdown. An inter-class or cross-class cramdown takes place when a 
reorganization plan is imposed on one or more dissenting classes of creditors. An inter-
class cramdown occurs when a plan is imposed on some individual creditors within the 
same class. Therefore, this intra-class cramdown is no more than a majority rule. In the 
absence of this majority rule, there would be fewer differences between reorganizations 
in and out of bankruptcy, since totally private reorganizations (workouts) usually require 
unanimity of creditors to modify the debtor´s capital structure. In a formal 
reorganization procedure, however, or even in some pre-insolvency proceedings such 
as the Scheme of Arrangement, this unanimity rule is substituted by a majority rule. 
Otherwise, not only it would be virtually impose to reach a reorganization agreement 
(especially in large companies with many creditors and complex capital structures), but 
some holdout problems may also arise since many individual creditors may 
opportunistically try to blackmail the debtor to get paid first.  
In most insolvent firms, the debtor has various classes of creditors. Therefore, even if a 
majority rule is provided to facilitate the approval of a plan within a class, the debtor will 
face a second challenge: getting the approval of all the classes. Therefore, it will be 
more costly to approve a reorganization plan. For this reason, many countries around 
the world seeking to facilitate corporate reorganizations have moved from their simple 
majority rule or intra-class cramdown towards a system of inter-class or cross-class 
cramdown. According to this type of cramdown, the approval of a single class of 
creditors (something that usually requires a majority of creditors within that class)34, a 
 
33 For a review of the costs of bankruptcy, see Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some 
Evidence, 32 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 337 (1977), showing that the direct costs of bankruptcy were 
3% to 4 % of the pre-bankruptcy market value of total assets in large firms. These figures are 
relatively consistent with Lawrence A. Weiss, BANKRUPTCY RESOLUTION: DIRECT COSTS AND 
VIOLATION OF PRIORITY OF CLAIMS, 27 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 285 (1990). However, in 
Gregor Andrade and Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (not  Economic) Distress? 
Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions That Became Distressed, 53 JOURNAL OF 
FINANCE 1443 (1998), the authors show the costs of financial distress represents 10-20% of the 
market value of the firm. These costs, however, seem to be higher in the United Kingdom, at 
least for small firms. See Julian Franks and Oren Sussman, Financial Distress and Bank 
Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK Companies, 9 REVIEW OF FINANCE 65 (2005), 
reporting that insolvency liquidations subtract 20% to 40% of the company´s proceeds in the 
context of small and medium size enterprises. 
34 In the US, a plan is deemed approve by a class of creditor if at least a majority in number and 
2/3 in value vote in favour the plan. In the Singapore and the United Kingdom, the approval of a 
plan under a Scheme of Arrangement requires a higher majority (majority in number and at 
least 75% in value). For a fantastic analysis of the Scheme of Arrangement, with particular 
focus on the regulation in the United Kingdom but providing an overview about this tool in other 
jurisdictions, see Jennifer Payne, SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND 
OPERATION (Cambridge University Press, 2014). For the Scheme of Arrangement in Singapore 
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plan can be imposed automatically on some dissenting classes of creditors. Therefore, 
many costs associated with the approval of a reorganization plan (including time, 
resources and negotiation efforts) can be saved.  
Obviously, a cross-class cramdown (or just ‘cramdown’ as it is called in the United 
States) without any further protections could harm some creditors´ rights and could 
lead to an ex ante increase in the cost of debt in the country. For that reason, a plan 
can only be crammed down in the United States if several requirements are met, 
including two primary tests to protect the interests of the different classes of creditors 
as a whole. First, the plan must be fair and equitable.35 A plan is fair and equitable if it 
respects the absolute priority rule.36 Therefore, junior creditors cannot get any value 
from the firm until senior creditors have been paid in full or allows junior creditors to 
keep part of the firm´s value, and the shareholders cannot get anything until the 
creditors have been paid in full or decide to give up part of their claims. Second, the 
plan should not discriminate unfairly, what basically means that similarly situated 
creditors should receive a similar payout. By imposing these requirements, debtors can 
enjoy the benefits of the cross-class cramdown without harming creditors´ rights. Thus, 
these conditions make the cross-class cramdown a Pareto efficient solution. 
In addition to these mechanisms seeking to protect each class of claimants, individual 
creditors also enjoy other protections. Among others, under the best interest of 
creditors’ test existing in the US Chapter 11,37 creditors are allowed to receive under 
the reorganization plan at least what they would receive under a hypothetical Chapter 7 
liquidation. Therefore, while the cross-class cramdown can be seen as a pro-debtor 
provision, in the sense that it facilitates the approval of a reorganization plan, the best 
interest of creditor test is a pro-creditor provision. Namely, it makes sure that every 
creditor (including those voting against the approval of the plan) will receive at least 
what they could get under a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. Therefore, the 
combination of both the best interest of creditors test and the cross-class cram down 
seems to create a Pareto improvement, that is, a situation in which some gains are 
created and nobody is worse off. Moreover, in addition to being beneficial for the 
parties involved, the best interest of creditor test also promotes the efficient allocation 
of the debtor´s assets. Therefore, it can also be seen as a desirable tool for society as 
a whole.  
In the absence of the absolute priority rule, the non-discrimination rule and the best 
interest of creditor test, the existence of a cross-class cramdown would be 
economically undesirable. Ex post, it would allow insolvent debtors to impose a plan on 
dissenting creditors, even if the creditors are worse off or unfairly discriminated, or the 
debtor´s business is not economically viable. As a result, from an ex ante perspective, 
creditors would be more reluctant to lend money. Therefore, there could be a 
 
after the 2017 insolvency reform, see Gerard McCormack and Wai Yee Wan, Transplanting 
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code into Singapore’s restructuring and insolvency laws: 
opportunities and challenges, JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW STUDIES (2018); Meng Seng Wee, 
Whither the Scheme of Arrangement in Singapore: More Chapter 11, Less Scheme? Working 
Paper (2017) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2922956) 
35 See 11 U.S. Code § 1129(b)(1) 
36 Douglas G. Baird, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY (Foundation Press, 5th Edition, 2010), p. 71. 
37 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) 
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contraction of credit or an undesirable increase in the cost of debt. Alternatively, 
creditors could also respond with stricter covenants that may end up harming 
entrepreneurship, innovation and firm´s access to finance.  
Hence, any country considering the possibility of implementation of a cross-class 
cramdown should include other devices to protect creditors such as the best interest of 
creditor test, the absolute priority rule and the non-discrimination rule. Thus, the 
insolvency framework would become more attractive to debtors without harming 
creditors. Otherwise, value can be destroyed for society if, for example, by favouring 
the reorganization of viable debtors in financial distress, the insolvency framework 
incentivizes an increase in the cost of debt.  
Moreover, in countries without previous exposure to the cross-class cramdown, and 
more generally in the valuation issues regarding the correct application of the 
cramdown existing in the US Chapter 11, some further requirements can be 
implemented. For example, under the new insolvency framework in Singapore, the 
cross-class cramdown can only be applied if, in addition to the requirements existing in 
the United States (i.e., approval by at least one class, respect of the absolute priority 
rule, non-discrimination test, etc.), the plan is also approved by a supermajority of 
creditors representing more than 50% in number and at least 75% of the company´s 
liabilities. In my opinion, even though this later provision might not be optimal for the 
promotion of an efficient restructuring framework, it might make sense in jurisdictions in 
which courts, creditors, debtors, and insolvency practitioners are not familiar with the 
rationale and provisions of the cross-class cramdown. Otherwise, the existence of the 
cramdown may do more harm than good, since it may create uncertainty and it can 
even lead to an ex ante increase in the cost of debt even if creditors do not perceive 
they are protected enough – even if they were. Therefore, in countries without 
sophisticated courts and insolvency practitioners, and even in countries like Singapore, 
where notwithstanding the sophistication of the judiciary and the industry, the 
cramdown is a new provision that requires familiarity with all the issues surrounding it 
(including valuation issues), additional majorities for the approval of the plan might be 
desirable, at least while the market becomes familiar with this new restructuring tool.  
2.2.4. DIP financing 
Lenders might be rationally reluctant to provide funds to insolvent firms due to their 
higher risk of default. As a result of this lack of finance, many valuable investment 
projects might be pursued. As a way to solve this underinvestment problem38, 
insolvency jurisdictions around the world usually provide new lenders and suppliers 
 
38 The concept of underinvestment project refers to those situations in which a valuable project 
cannot be pursued usually by the lack of finance. See Stewart C. Myers and Nicholas S. Majluf, 
Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions: When Firms Have Information the Investors Do 
Not Have, 13 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 187 (1984). By contrast, the concept of 
‘overinvestment’ refers to those situations in which projects with a negative net present value 
are being financed. See Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers and Franklin Allen, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE (McGraw-Hill Irwin, 10th Edition, 2011), p. 291.   
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with an administrative expense priority in bankruptcy. Thus, they will have more 
incentives to keep doing business with the debtor.39  
However, in some cases, an administrative expense priority is not enough. Moreover, 
as debtors usually lack unencumbered assets to offer to their creditors, it becomes 
more difficult to have access to new finance. For this reason, the US Bankruptcy Code 
decided to solve this problem by enacting a variety of exceptional remedies to obtain 
debtor in possession (DIP) financing.40 Namely, according to section 364 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code, debtors can obtain new credit by offering a super-priority status to 
the new lender. This super priority status can take several forms: (i) getting paid ahead 
of all administrative expenses; (ii) being secured by a lien that it is not otherwise 
subject to a lien; (iii) being secured by a junior lien on property of the estate that is 
subject to a lien; or (iv) in exceptional cases, and subject to various requirements, even 
being secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate.41  
The DIP financing can be seen as another powerful tool to promote the reorganization 
of a viable business. For this reason, many countries and regions around the world, 
including Singapore and the European Union, have decided to incorporate this device 
in their new restructuring framework. However, since it is not clear whether this 
exceptional mechanism to obtain new financing may alter pre-existing rights, and 
therefore it may harm creditors’ rights, other jurisdictions, as the United Kingdom, have 
been more reluctant to implement this provision in their new restructuring framework.42 
In any case, in order for this provision to create a Pareto improvement, or at least to 
avoid any harmful effects on pre-existing creditors, and ultimately on the cost of debt, 
some further protections should be put in place. These protections, provided in the US 
Bankruptcy Code and other jurisdictions replicating the DIP financing model existing in 
the United States, will be mainly focused on allowing this new financing very 
exceptionally, and provided that, in addition to protecting existing creditors, debtors 
proves that they cannot get credit otherwise, and this new financing will make them 
increase the value of the firm. Therefore, from an economic perspective, these 
 
39 George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL STUDIES 225, 249-252 (1992). 
40 For an analysis of the rationale and regulation of DIP financing in the United States, see 
George G. Triantis, Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VANDERBILT 
LAW REVIEW 901 (1993); George G. Triantis, Debtor-in-Possession Financing in Bankruptcy, in 
Barry Adler (dir.), RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW (Elgar Publishing, 
2018); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 225, 249-252 (1992); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and 
Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 1905 (2004); Richard 
Squire, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY AND FINANCIAL REORGANIZATION (Wolters Kluwer, 2016), pp. 
235-260; Barry E. Adler, Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, BANKRUPTCY: CASES, 
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, FOUNDATION PRESS (4th Edition, 2007), pp. 475-520.   
41 See 11 U.S. Code § 364(c)(d). Similar provisions can be found in the new restructuring 
framework existing in Singapore.  
42 The United Kingdom has alleged that they have a very efficient lending market and that 
makes the need for DIP financing less relevant. In my opinion, however, the ability to affect pre-
existing creditor´s rights, even if these rights are adequately protected and the new financing 
creates value for the creditors as a whole, has probably made the UK government to be more 
concern with the impact of this provision in its lending markets. For this reason, in a recent 
consultation they stated that they are not in favour of implementing a DIP financing regime in 
the United Kingdom.  
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requirements seem to ensure that this new financing creates a Pareto improvement, or 
a situation in which, while generating some gains, nobody will be worse off. By doing 
so, the DIP financing regime can create ex post efficiencies without harming ex ante 
efficiency.  
2.2.5. Moratorium  
A moratorium or automatic stay43 prohibits creditors from enforcing their claims against 
the debtor´s assets. Thus, by avoiding a race to collect, this insolvency tool not only 
saves collection costs but more importantly it protects the debtor´s going concern 
value, if any. For this reason, some authors have classified the automatic stay as the 
most important bankruptcy tool.44  
Due to the desirability of the automatic stay to facilitate a corporate restructuring, most 
(if not all) insolvency jurisdictions around the world provide debtors with a type of 
automatic stay in their reorganization procedures.45 Thus, the moratorium is not 
something unique of Chapter 11 reorganizations. The interesting development with the 
DFCH11 is that, while the moratorium has been traditionally available only in formal 
reorganization proceedings, nowadays countries are allowing to usage of this 
insolvency tool in their pre-insolvency framework.46 Therefore, companies do not need 
to file for formal reorganization procedures in order to use this insolvency tool. They 
can just use the new DFCH11 which is being implemented in many jurisdictions around 
the world.  
2.2.6. Non-enforceability of ipso facto clauses 
An ipso facto clause is a contractual term that allows a party to terminate a contract 
upon the existence of a specified event. Very often the triggering event is the 
commencement of a formal insolvency proceeding. By including this type of clauses in 
a commercial agreement, the counterparty can avoid the harmful effects associated 
with being involved in an insolvency proceeding.  
While these contractual terms may seem desirable for solvent counterparties, it can 
exacerbate the underinvestment problems potentially faced by viable debtors facing 
financial trouble. Therefore, in addition to destroying value, the existence of these 
clauses may reduce the likelihood of reorganizing a viable business in distress. For this 
reason, countries seeking to provide a more restructuring-friendly environment are 
amending their insolvency (or pre-insolvency) framework to prohibit the enforcement of 
 
43 This article uses the word ‘moratorium’ (commonly used in the United Kingdom, Singapore 
and other Commonwealth jurisdictions) and ‘automatic stay’ (used in the United States) as 
synonyms.  
44 Richard Squire, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY AND FINANCIAL REORGANIZATION (Wolters Kluwer, 
2016), p. 13. 
45 In general, this automatic stay applies to both unsecured creditors and secured creditors, 
even though the stay on secured creditors is usually subject to special rules.  
46 Some of the first countries adopting a moratorium outside of formal insolvency proceedings 
were Singapore and Spain. Nowadays, this moratorium has been proposed for a new 
restructuring tool in the United Kingdom, as well as for the pre-insolvency mechanism 
established in the European Directive on Preventing Frameworks. 
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these clauses, except for some classes of creditors or contracts (e.g., financial 
contracts).47  
Even though the treatment of ipso facto clauses differs across jurisdictions, those 
countries restricting the enforcement of ipso facto clauses do so by stating that these 
clauses will not become enforceable for the sole fact that a debtor enters a formal 
insolvency/restructuring procedure. Therefore, if the debtor defaults on payments or it 
breaches any other contractual terms, the counterparty will be entitled to enforce an 
ipso facto clause, since the enforcement of this contractual term will not be exclusively 
due to the commencement of a formal  insolvency/restructuring proceeding.  
Whereas the desirability of these provisions might be unclear, it is interesting to 
observe how these clauses are being implemented in many pre-insolvency frameworks 
around the world, even when this tool was only available in formal reorganization.48 
Therefore, it reflects how many jurisdictions are moving toward a more debtor-friendly 
environment and, more importantly for the purpose of this paper, how countries are 
implementing in their pre-insolvency frameworks some tools traditionally existing in 
formal reorganization procedures.  
2.3. Why a DFCH11 instead of a formal Chapter 11 reorganization?  
The analysis of the restructuring framework which is being implemented in many 
jurisdictions around the world seem to reflect an interesting move in the insolvency 
space. On the one hand, it reflects a rise of pre-insolvency law. On the other hand, it 
shows how countries are implementing in their pre-insolvency frameworks tools 
traditionally available only in formal reorganization procedures (e.g., moratorium and 
non-enforceability of ipso facto clauses), and more especially tools exclusively or 
quasi-exclusively available in the US Chapter 11 such as the cross-class cramdown 
provision and the  availability of DIP financing. Therefore, these tendencies in 
insolvency law reflects what this article refers to as the rise of a ‘de facto Chapter 11’ 
(DFCH11), that is, a pre-insolvency procedure that looks like a US Chapter 11 
reorganization but it differs in three primary aspects. First, while the DFCH11 seeks to 
help debtors when they are not insolvent yet, a Chapter 11 reorganization procedure 
may serve as both a pre-insolvency mechanism and a formal insolvency proceeding 
seeking to help viable companies already unable to pay debts.49 Second, unlike what 
happens in the United States where a failure to reach a reorganization agreement 
under a Chapter 11 procedure leads to a Chapter 7 liquidation,50 companies in 
jurisdictions with a DFCH11 are still allowed to use formal reorganization procedures. 
 
47 Jurisdictions recently adopting the restriction of ipso facto clauses in their pre-insolvency or 
restructuring framework include Singapore and the European Union.  
48 These countries include, for example, Australia, the United States and Spain.  
49 For a comparison of pre-insolvency proceedings and the US Chapter 11, see Stephan 
Madaus, Leaving the Shadows of US Bankruptcy Law: A Proposal to Divide the Realms of 
Insolvency and Restructuring Law, 19(3) EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 615 
(2018). For an analysis of the features of pre-insolvency procedures from a positive and 
normative perspective, and comparing these procedures with the US Chapter 11 procedure, 
see also Nicolaes Tollenaar, PRE-INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: A NORMATIVE FOUNDATION AND 
FRAMEWORK (Oxford University Press, 2019).  
50 In fact, even unsuccessful workouts may be preventing from using Chapter 11 as a second 
shot to reorganize a company. See In Re Colonial Ford, Inc, 24 B.R. 1014 (1982) 
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Third, despite the similarities between the US Chapter 11 and the pre-insolvency 
proceedings implemented in many jurisdictions, there are still some tools exclusively 
available in formal reorganization procedures (e.g., avoidance actions).  
It seeks to interesting to observe how many countries are adopting the DFCH11 
instead of implementing the features of the US Chapter 11 into their formal 
reorganization procedures. In other words, it is not clear why countries are not just 
replacing their formal reorganization procedures for a Chapter 11-style reorganization 
procedures. If so, they would not even need to implement (or amend) a pre-insolvency 
proceeding, since the Chapter 11-style reorganization procedures can serve as both 
pre-insolvency proceeding and formal reorganization procedure.  
In my opinion, the adoption of a DFCH11 in a country´s pre-insolvency framework 
rather than adopting a formal Chapter 11 reorganization in their insolvency framework 
is probably explained by several factors. First, those jurisdictions adopting the DFCH11 
might not want to recognize the failure of their formal reorganization procedures. 
Indeed, the rise of the DFCH11 may be the consequence of the inefficiencies of many 
insolvency regimes. These inefficiencies not only include the unavailability of certain 
tools that may facilitate a financial restructuring in a more efficient manner (e.g., cross 
class cramdown) but also the stigma associated with insolvency proceedings, which 
many generate several costs for both debtors and society as a whole. Ex ante, it may 
encourage debtors to minimize the risk of insolvency by reducing either the use of debt 
or their level of risk. In either case, value can be destroyed, since companies will have 
a lower access to finance and they will not have incentives to invest in risky but 
profitable, innovative projects. Ex post, the stigma associated with insolvency 
proceedings may lead to several costs. During the procedure, many employees, 
costumers and lenders may decide to terminate their business relationships with the 
debtor. Therefore, value can be destroyed for the company, the creditors, and society 
as a whole. After the procedure, debtors emerging from bankruptcy may lose part of 
their reputation or trustworthiness among market participants. Therefore, this stigma 
can also lead to several costs for society, including the loss of value associated with 
not financing valuable projects that can create wealth and jobs, as well as hampering 
entrepreneurship and access to finance.  Hence, the existence of stigma can make an 
insolvency regime particularly harmful. And the more inefficient (or unattractive) an 
insolvency proceeding is, the more attractive other alternative solutions to bankruptcy 
might be.51  
Some people may argue that the stigma associated with insolvency proceedings may 
be the result of a cultural or sociological problem.52 Therefore, as getting rid of a 
 
51 Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, The low usage of bankruptcy procedures: A cultural problem? 
Lessons from Spain, IBERO-AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND FINANCE, WORKING PAPER SERIES, 
Núm. 1, 2016 (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2783666); 
Miguel García-Posada and Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti, Are there alternatives to bankruptcy? A 
study of small businesses distress in Spain, 5 JOURNAL OF THE SPANISH ECONOMIC 
ASSOCIATION 287 (2014). 
52 A summary of the authors and arguments supporting this hypothesis can be found in Tibor 
Tajti, Bankruptcy stigma and the second chance policy: the impact of bankruptcy stigma on 
business restructurings in China, Europe and the United States, 6 CHINA-EU LAW JOURNAL 1 
(2018); Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, The low usage of bankruptcy procedures: A cultural problem? 
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perception already inherent in a particular culture, it might make sense to forget about 
the stigmatized reorganization procedure and focus on enacting or improving the pre-
insolvency or restructuring framework. However, I do not think this argument is entirely 
convincing. In my opinion, even if the stigma associated with insolvency proceedings is 
a cultural problem, the origins of this problem can probably be found on the legal and 
institutional framework existing in the country. For example, China and Spain are 
countries in which insolvency proceedings seem to be subject to a very high stigma.53 
While some people have stated that this stigma is due to the lack of bankruptcy, 
reorganization, or even entrepreneurial culture,54 after a deeper analysis of the 
regulatory framework existing in both jurisdictions, perhaps the most reasonable 
explanation is not given by the ‘culture’ but by their institutions. Indeed, in China, 
insolvent debtors can be included in a list of ‘untrustworthy’ people. Spain, on other 
hand, still preserves a system of ‘labelling debtors’ existing since 1737,55 and corporate 
directors, in addition to being disqualified and subject to a set of reputational and civil 
sanctions, can also be liable for the company´s debts.56 Therefore, it will be rational for 
debtors operating in these countries to be afraid of becoming insolvent. In fact, this 
reason may help explain why these jurisdictions exhibit such as low rate of business 
bankruptcies.57 Therefore, the explanation would not be found on the lack of 
bankruptcy or entrepreneurial ‘culture’ in these countries but on an unattractive 
regulatory framework that encourage debtors to afraid of becoming insolvent by 
minimizing ex ante the risk of insolvency or avoiding ex post the use of formal 
bankruptcy procedures once they become insolvent.58 
 
Lessons from Spain, IBERO-AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND FINANCE, WORKING PAPER SERIES, 
Núm. 1, 2016. 
53 Tibor Tajti, Bankruptcy stigma and the second chance policy: the impact of bankruptcy stigma 
on business restructurings in China, Europe and the United States, 6 CHINA-EU LAW JOURNAL 1 
(2018); Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, The low usage of bankruptcy procedures: A cultural problem? 
Lessons from Spain, IBERO-AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND FINANCE, WORKING PAPER SERIES, 
Núm. 1, 2016.  
54 See supra, note 52. 
55 For an analysis of this institution, see Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, Hacia la supresión de la 
calificación del concurso, 28 REVISTA DE DERECHO CONCURSAL Y PARACONCURSAL 107 (2018). 
56 See article 172 and 172 bis of the 2003 Insolvency Act.  
57 Analyzing the relative use of bankruptcy procedures around the world, see Stijn Claessens 
and Leora F. Klapper Bankruptcy around the World: Explanations of Its Relative Use, 7 
AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW 253 (2005). Pointing out that Chinese bankruptcy 
procedures have been misused,  see Liu Mingkang and Wei Chuyi, Towards a Better Future for 
Chinese Bankruptcy Law: Problems and Potential, LAU CHOR TAK INSTITUTE OF GLOBAL 
ECONOMICS AND FINANCE THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG, WORKING PAPER Nº 62 (2017) 
(available at http://www.igef.cuhk.edu.hk/igef_media/working-
paper/IGEF/igef%20working%20paper%20no.%2062%20english%20version.pdf). Analyzing 
the reasons and implications of the low use of bankruptcy procedures in Spain, see Aurelio 
Gurrea Martínez, The low usage of bankruptcy procedures: A cultural problem? Lessons from 
Spain, IBERO-AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND FINANCE, WORKING PAPER SERIES, Núm. 1, 2016; 
Marco Celentani, Miguel García-Posada and Fernando Gómez, The Spanish Business 
Bankruptcy Puzzle, FEDEA WORKING PAPER 2010-11 (2010); Miguel García-Posada and Juan 
S. Mora-Sanguinetti, Are there alternatives to bankruptcy? A study of small businesses distress 
in Spain, 5 JOURNAL OF THE SPANISH ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 287 (2014). 
58 Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, The low usage of bankruptcy procedures: A cultural problem? 
Lessons from Spain, IBERO-AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND FINANCE, WORKING PAPER SERIES, 
Núm. 1, 2016; Marco Celentani, Miguel García-Posada and Fernando Gómez, The Spanish 
Business Bankruptcy Puzzle, FEDEA WORKING PAPER 2010-11 (2010). 
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A simple legal reform in these countries cannot quickly delete the stigma associated 
with insolvency proceedings. The anti-debtor environment existing in these countries 
have probably made an institutional problem a sociological one. Therefore, even if the 
legislator implements several policies to reduce the stigma associated with a situation 
of insolvency, it will not be easy to get rid of it. It will take time. However, some legal 
reforms may help. For instance, in the US, the legislator decided to use the word 
‘debtor’ rather than ‘bankrupt’ to refer to insolvent debtors. In the UK, ‘bankruptcy law’ 
is no longer used for companies. Instead, this area of law is called ‘insolvency law’, and 
some authors even start to distinguish between ‘insolvency law’ and ‘restructuring 
law’.59 More interestingly, in Chile, the legislator decided to name the institution in 
charge of overseeing insolvency proceedings as ‘Superintendence of Insolvency and 
Re-entrepreneurship’ in an attempt to fight against the stigma traditionally associated 
with insolvency proceedings.60  
A second reason to explain why many countries may have decided to amend their pre-
insolvency frameworks instead of enhancing their formal reorganization procedures 
can be found on the political costs associated with implementing a major insolvency 
reform. Indeed, insolvency reforms might not be popular, especially if they are not 
conducted after a thoughtful economic analysis and therefore making the insolvency 
reform creates a Pareto improvement. Sometimes, politicians do not conduct this 
economic analysis of regulation and they enact some laws that may harm the interest 
of a variety of stakeholders (e.g., employees, banks, debtors, etc.). In other cases, this 
economic analysis is conducted, but a reform cannot be Pareto efficient but just Kaldor-
Hicks efficient.61 Therefore, it would generate winners and losers, even if the gains for 
the winners exceed the losses for the losers and the latter is compensated. 
Additionally, insolvency reforms imply high negotiation efforts, since an insolvency 
regime may affect a variety of stakeholders. This point becomes particularly relevant in 
the context of supranational organizations such as the European Union, where in 
addition to the internal disputes among different stakeholders, each country may have 
its own views about the role and goals of insolvency law. For this reason, it would be 
very difficult to harmonizing formal insolvency procedures.  
In contrast, a reform of ‘pre-insolvency’ law seems much easier, not only because ‘pre-
insolvency’ or ‘restructuring’ law sounds more appealing than ‘insolvency’ or 
‘bankruptcy’ but also because pre-insolvency procedures usually involve fewer 
insolvency tools. Therefore, some may argue that a reform of pre-insolvency law may 
 
59 Some authors even speak about ‘insolvency law’ and ‘restructuring law’ as part of the general 
concept of the ‘law of corporate distress’. See Sarah Paterson, Rethinking the Role of the Law 
of Corporate Distress in the Twenty-First Century, 35 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 1 
(2015). For a distinction between ‘insolvency law’ and ‘restructuring law’, see also Stephan 
Madaus, Leaving the Shadows of US Bankruptcy Law: A Proposal to Divide the Realms of 
Insolvency and Restructuring Law, 19(3) EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 615 
(2018). 
60 For an analysis of the role played by this institution, see http://www.superir.gob.cl/  
61 About these concepts of efficiency, and why the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is more 
commonly used in practice than the concept of Pareto efficiency, see Richard Posner, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (Wolters Kluwer, 8th Edition, 2011), pp. 17-20; Rizwaan J. Mokal, 
On Fairness and Efficiency, 66 (3) MODERN LAW REVIEW 452, 454-156 (2003).  
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have a lower impact on a variety of stakeholders, even if this assertion is probably 
untrue.62  
Finally, the rise of pre-insolvency law can also be due to the fact, or at least perception, 
that a pre-insolvency procedure may be more efficient than formal insolvency 
proceedings. In other words, it can be argued that a pre-insolvency mechanism 
provides a less costly solution to resolve the debtor´s financial trouble.63 However, 
while it is true that pre-insolvency procedures may generate lower direct bankruptcy 
costs, and they may reduce other indirect costs associated with a situation of 
insolvency (e.g., reputational costs, underinvestment problems, etc.), other problems 
may arise. Namely, the use of non-formal insolvency mechanisms to deal with a 
debtor´s financial distress may generate other problems, including: (i) a situation of 
opportunism of debtors vis-à-vis creditors if the pre-insolvency mechanism does not 
provide enough protections to all interested parties; (ii) a situation of opportunism of 
some creditors vis-à-vis the debtor if the pre-insolvency mechanism does not provide 
effective tools to prevent holdouts; (iii) higher coordination problems if the pre-
insolvency framework does not create a proper forum for discussing, sharing and 
analysing information; and (iv) enough devices to protect the successful reorganization 
of a viable company facing financial trouble. Therefore, it is not clear whether a pre-
insolvency procedure is more desirable than an efficient reorganization regime. 
Regardless of the reason leading to favour pre-insolvency over formal insolvency-
proceedings, or whether this shift from ‘insolvency’ to ‘pre-insolvency’ law is more or 
less desirable, the truth is that most countries around the world seem to be adopting 
pre-insolvency proceedings in their restructuring framework. And this fact implies that, 
in addition to addressing other potential problems generated by this move,64 legislators 
should adapt their formal reorganization procedures to this new era of pre-insolvency 
law. Otherwise, some inefficiencies might arise, as it will be mentioned in section 4.  
3. Adapting the formal insolvency framework to the era of pre-insolvency law 
The DFCH11 seeks to provide viable companies with an effective restructuring 
mechanism to sort out their financial trouble. Moreover, since debtors will save 
 
62 Emphasizing that the new pre-insolvency framework established in the European Directive for 
Preventing Restructuring can affect a variety of stakeholders and the use of formal insolvency 
proceedings can provide a higher level of protection, see Horst Eidenmüller, Contracting for a 
European Insolvency Regime, 18 EUROPEAN BUSINESS AND ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 273, 289-
291, 298-303 (2017).  
63 For an analysis of the features and advantages of pre-insolvency proceedings, see Nicolaes 
Tollenaar, PRE-INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: A NORMATIVE FOUNDATION AND FRAMEWORK (Oxford 
University Press, 2019), pp. 38-80, 188-250. 
64 See Host Eidenmüller and Kristin Van Zwieten, Restructuring the European Business 
Enterprise: The EU Commission Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and 
Insolvency, ECGI LAW WORKING PAPER NO. 301/2015 (available at https://ecgi.global/working-
paper/restructuring-european-business-enterprise-eu-commission-recommendation-new-
approach). Emphasizing that the rise of ‘pre-insolvency law’, at least as it has been proposed in 
the European Directive, may create a refuge for non-viable debtors that may end up increasing 
financial costs for firms, see Horst Eidenmüller, Contracting for a European Insolvency Regime, 
18 EUROPEAN BUSINESS AND ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 273 (2017).   
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significant costs by not filing for bankruptcy,65 an out-of-court restructuring should also 
be in the interests of the creditors. Therefore, if a debtor does not reach a pre-
insolvency agreement, or it does not even try, there will be reasons to believe that the 
company is not economically viable or the creditors do not trust the current 
shareholders/managers. In either case, the company should be liquidated to sell the 
assets individually or as a going concern, depending on whether the business is 
economically viable or not. As a result of this situation, I believe that the rise of the 
DFCH11 should lead to restrict the use of formal reorganization procedures. Otherwise, 
many debtors that do not deserve to be reorganized (i.e., non-viable firms and viable 
businesses managed by the wrong people) may opportunistically file for 
reorganization.66 And if so, creditors may respond with an ex ante increase in the cost 
of debt, and jobs can lost if economically viable businesses managed by the wrong 
people are not quickly sold to third parties. 
Opportunistic filings for reorganization can be reduced with ex ante or ex post 
mechanisms. Ex ante, debtors can be required to prove certain financial and viability 
requirements, as it happens in most countries around the world. According to this 
system, unless these financial requirements are shown to the court, the bankruptcy 
petition will be dismissed. Alternatively, courts can facilitate the commencement of 
reorganization procedures without imposing high burdens, as it happens in the United 
States. Under this model, the opportunistic use of reorganization procedures can be 
managed ex post, for example, dismissing the case or, in more severe cases, imposing 
sanctions to the insolvent debtors or its directors.  
In the absence of a DFCH11, there are clearer reasons to favour a system of ex post 
control. On the one hand, it may save significant costs associated with postponing the 
commencement of a bankruptcy procedures. Namely, as the debtor has probably 
become insolvent already, it may be subject to enforcement actions initiated by its 
creditors. And if so, it may lose certain assets that can be essential for the continuation 
of a business that, in many cases, can be economically viable. Moreover, if the 
situation of financial distress is observed by certain stakeholders (e.g., costumers, 
employees, lenders), they may want to terminate their business or contractual 
relationships with the company. Thus, they will exacerbate the debtor´s financial 
trouble, and even destroy the viability of a previously viable business. Therefore, 
postponing the commencement of the insolvency proceeding can be costly, since 
financially distressed debtors will be losing value every day that they do not enjoy the 
protections and restructuring tools available in reorganization procedures.  
On the other hand, the proof of certain financial requirements can create other 
problems. First, it will require a higher sophisticated of courts. Second, as a result of 
the higher involvement of courts, more resources will be needed. Third, in countries 
without reliable judicial systems (as it happens in many emerging economies), more 
involvement of courts may imply a higher risk of corruption. Finally, while conducting an 
insolvency test can be reasonably done by sophisticated courts, the assessment of 
 
65 See supra, note 33.  
66 The expression ‘opportunistic filling for reorganization’ used in this paper will refer to any 
situation in which a debtor, even in good faith, files for reorganization when it should not, usually 
because the company is not viable or the creditors do not trust the shareholders/managers.  
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other financial conditions potentially imposed ex ante (e.g., viability) can be more 
problematic.  
Therefore, as a general rule, the use of ex post controls can be more efficient. 
However, this situation may change in countries with a DFCH11. In these jurisdictions, 
the risk of using formal reorganization procedures opportunistically increases, since the 
debtor may have two available options: (i) the DFCH11; and (ii) then, if the DFCH fails, 
the debtor can try an agreement through a formal reorganization procedure.67 
Therefore, many non-viable debtors or even viable business managed by the wrong 
people may opportunistically delay the commencement of liquidation procedures. 
Hence, the pie available for distribution may be reduced due to the costs incurred 
during this period. Moreover, many jobs can be lost if viable businesses are not quickly 
sold to third parties. As a result of this potential destruction of value, even if debtors do 
not finally use reorganization procedures opportunistically, lenders can respond with an 
ex ante increase in the cost of debt. Therefore, in order to avoid these inefficiencies, 
various reforms seem to be needed.  
On the one hand, debtors seeking to use formal reorganization procedures in countries 
with a DFCH11 should be subject to stricter eligibility requirements. After all, if a debtor 
does not reach a pre-insolvency agreement, or it does not even try, there will be 
reasons to believe that the company is not economically viable or the creditors do not 
trust the current shareholders/managers. In either case, it will not the deserve to be 
reorganized.  
In my opinion, these higher eligibility requirements should consist on three primary 
aspects. First, debtors should show that the going concern value of the firm is higher 
than its liquidation value.68 Thus, they will prove that the company is economically 
viable in the sense that the assets are best allocated in their current use.69.  
 
67 Actually, the debtor will even have three options it also tries a purely contractual agreement 
(workouts) before considering more formal restructuring procedures.  
68 For a general overview about valuation methods in bankruptcy, see Kenneth Ayotte and 
Edward R. Morrison, Valuation Disputes in Corporate Bankruptcy, 116 UNIVERSITY OF 
PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1819, 1825-1831 (2019). Even though the value of a firm as a going 
concern can be a very subjective value, it can still provide a useful number to have in mind. This 
number should be compared with the value of the firm in a hypothetical orderly piecemeal 
liquidation. See In Re Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc., 120 B.R. 279. Thus, the value of the firm 
in its current use will be ultimately compared with the value of the firm under one of the worse 
scenarios, which is a piecemeal liquidation. For a general analysis of the valuation of 
companies in financial distress, see Stuart C. Gilson, Edith S. Hotchkiss and Richard S. 
Ruback, Valuation of Bankrupt Firms, 13 REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 43 (2000); Michael 
Christal and Rizwaan J. Mokal, The valuation of distressed companies: a conceptual 
framework, 3 INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE RESCUE 63 (2006); Kenneth Ayotte and Edward R. 
Morrison, Valuation Disputes in Corporate Bankruptcy, 116 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW 
REVIEW 1819 (2019);  Nicolaes Tollenaar, PRE-INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: A NORMATIVE 
FOUNDATION AND FRAMEWORK (Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 99-113.  
69 For an analysis of the concept of viability, and why non-viable (or economically distressed) 
firms should be liquidated and viable companies just facing a problem of financial distress 
should be reorganized, see John Armour, The law and economics of corporate insolvency, 
ESRC CENTRE FOR BUSINESS RESEARCH UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, WORKING PAPER 197 (2001), 
p. 4; Michelle J. White, Does Chapter 11 Save Economically Inefficient Firms? 72 WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY 1319 (1994); Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Corporate 
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Second, the debtor should also show that it has the support of a minimum percentage 
of creditors as a means of proving that a reorganization agreement will be possible. 
Otherwise, the commencement of a reorganization procedure may not be justified, 
since the creditors will unlikely trust the shareholders/managers. Therefore, a 
liquidation procedure may seem more desirable. If the company is economically viable 
but the creditors do not trust the shareholders/managers, the company can be sold as 
a going concern in a liquidation procedure. If the creditors do not trust the 
shareholders/managers and the company is not even viable, the company´s assets 
should be sold piecemeal in a liquidation procedure. In either case, the commencement 
of a liquidation procedure will provide a more efficient solution. By contrast, if a 
reorganization procedure is opened, various risks may arise, especially if the managers 
are not replaced by sophisticated insolvency practitioners capable of quickly 
distinguishing between viable and non-viable firms and these insolvency practitioners 
are not required to maximize the interest of the creditors. In these conditions are not 
met, the commencement of a liquidation procedure may take more than expected, and 
value can be lost during the process. 
Third, the debtor must explain why it did not use the pre-insolvency framework, or why 
the DFCH11 failed. Otherwise, despite the fact that there might be valid reasons to file 
for a formal reorganization procedure (e.g., lack of time to reorganize under the 
DFCH11 or inability to use avoiding powers as a way to bring certain assets that can 
facilitate the reorganization of a viable business), the risk of using reorganization 
procedures opportunistically will be too high, especially in jurisdictions where these 
procedures are not managed by a third party (e.g., administrator) but by the debtor 
itself (sometimes under the supervision of an insolvency practitioner). Indeed, in 
countries in which an administrator or judicial manager is appointed to run the company 
during the formal reorganization procedures, as it happens in the United Kingdom and 
Singapore, the risk of using reorganization procedures opportunistically will be lower, 
provided that the administrator has the duty to maximize the interest of the creditors. 
Indeed, if this duty is not imposed, administrators may have incentives favor 
reorganization over liquidation as a strategy to market themselves as experts in turning 
around companies in financial distress, or just because liquidation may have worse 
publicity. In contrast, in countries in which the debtor exclusively manages the insolvent 
firm, as it happens in the United States, or where the debtor remains in possession 
under the supervision of an insolvency practitioner appointed by the court (as it 
happens in countries like Spain, Chile or Colombia), the risk of using reorganization 
procedures opportunistically will be higher. In these jurisdictions, the debtor –even if it 
 
Bankruptcy, 91 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1199, 1200-1201 (2005); Michelle J. White, The Corporate 
Bankruptcy Decision, 3 (2) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 129 (1989); Douglas G. Baird, 
The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An Overview of the Law and Economics of Financially 
Distressed Firms, CHICAGO WORKING PAPER IN LAW & ECONOMICS NO 43 (1997), pp. 9-10. In my 
opinion, even though, for simplicity and familiarity, it is more common to distinguish between 
viable and non-viable firms, it is more precise to speak about ‘economically efficient firms’ or 
‘economically inefficient firms’. After all, insolvency law should make sure that the assets are 
efficiently allocated and that is actually what some insolvency provisions such as the best 
interest of credit test seek to achieve. Therefore, the concept of ‘viable firm’ used in insolvency 
law should be understood as what some economists have called economically efficient firms. 
See Michelle, J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganization 
and Out-of-Court Debt Restructuring, 10 (2) JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION 
268, 269-274 (1994).  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3290366 
27 
 
is supervised by a third party– will have incentives to postpone the commencement of a 
liquidation procedure in the hope that its financial situation will improve in the future. 
After all, in addition to the sentimental value potentially attached to the business, if the 
shareholders have already lost everything, the existence of limited liability will prevent 
them from incurring further losses. Therefore, since the shareholders can recover part 
of their investments in the unlikely event that the company improves its financial 
situation, and the losses and expenses generated by keeping the firm alive will be 
borne by the creditors, shareholders will have incentives to delay the reorganization 
procedure even if the quick commencement of a liquidation procedure provides a more 
desirable outcome for the creditors and, in cases of viable businesses managed by the 
wrong people, even for the employees.  
As an alternative approach to subjecting debtors to a higher scrutiny, jurisdictions 
implementing a DFCH11 may consider going beyond and implementing in their 
DFCH11 those features from formal reorganization procedures missing in the DFCH11 
(e.g., avoidance actions). In these latter circumstances, however, the legislator should 
abolish the formal reorganization procedure existing in the country. Otherwise, there 
will be a duplication of reorganization procedures that not only can be misleading for 
debtors, creditors and other market participants, but it can also exacerbate some of the 
problems and inefficiencies generated by the lack of coordination between insolvency 
and pre-insolvency law.  
4. Conclusion 
Several countries and regions around the world, including Singapore, the United 
Kingdom, and the European Union, are amending their restructuring framework to 
implement a reorganization tool that looks like a US Chapter 11 reorganization. 
However, unlike in the United States, where unsuccessful reorganizations lead to 
Chapter 7 liquidations, companies using a DFCH11 are still allowed to use formal 
reorganization procedures. This paper has pointed out that, whereas the rise of the 
DFCH11 is not necessarily undesirable provided that some further protections are put 
in place, those jurisdictions implementing this restructuring should adapt their formal 
insolvency framework to this new era of ‘pre-insolvency law’. Otherwise, some 
inefficiencies can be created from this lack of coordination between insolvency and pre-
insolvency law.   
Namely, it has been argued that, in this new era of pre-insolvency law, debtors seeking 
to use formal reorganization procedures should be subject to stricter eligibility 
requirements. After all, if companies do not use a pre-insolvency mechanism that may 
facilitate, at a lower cost, a financial restructuring by providing some tools traditionally 
existing in a Chapter 11 reorganization procedure, or these pre-insolvency agreements 
fail, there will be reasons to believe that either the company is not viable or the 
creditors do not trust the managers. In either case, the company will not deserve to be 
reorganized. Therefore, unless some enhanced controls are put in place to prevent 
these companies from using formal reorganization procedures, there will be an 
increase in the number of debtors opportunistically filing for reorganization. And if so, 
some costs can be created. Ex ante, creditors might respond with an increase in the 
cost of debt. Ex post, value can be destroyed if non-viable firms are allowed to use 
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formal reorganization procedures, and jobs and wealth might be lost if economically 
viable businesses managed by the wrong people are not quickly sold as a going 
concern instead of being allowed to try (sometimes again) a reorganization agreement. 
Therefore, even though the ability to use reorganization procedures opportunistically 
will be more unlikely in jurisdictions where these procedures are managed by 
sophisticated insolvency practitioners rather than by the debtor itself (sometimes under 
the supervision of an insolvency practitioner), countries implementing a DFCH11 
should make sure that their formal insolvency framework are adapted to this new era of 
pre-insolvency law. 
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